Key Questions in Intercultural Philosophy

By Reza Gholami, Faculty Member, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies

Introduction: What is Intercultural Philosophy?

Intercultural philosophy is an approach that emerged in the late 20th century. According to Reinhard Mall, one of its founders, it is “an attempt to understand philosophy not merely as a Western phenomenon but as a universal possibility realized differently across various cultures” (Mall & Hülsmann, 1989). Unlike comparative philosophy, which focuses on comparing two or more philosophical traditions, intercultural philosophy emphasizes active dialogue and interaction among diverse intellectual traditions.

Franz Martin Wimmer, a German philosopher, defines intercultural philosophy as “philosophizing in the context of cultural plurality.” He argues it represents “not a new subject area but a shift in philosophy’s self-understanding” (Wimmer, 2004). In the words of Indian philosopher Ram Adhar Mall, intercultural philosophy “does not just talk about the other but engages in dialogue with the other” (Mall, 2000).

Importance and Benefits of Intercultural Philosophy

The significance of intercultural philosophy can be explored in several dimensions:

1. Challenging Eurocentrism:
   As Latin American philosopher Enrique Dussel critiques, modern Western philosophy has wrongly presented itself as the only universal philosophy (Dussel, 1985). Intercultural philosophy challenges this Eurocentrism, showing that intellectual traditions from China, India, Islam, Africa, and other cultures also possess rich philosophical capacities.
2. Conceptual Enrichment:
   Jorge J.E. Gracia notes that “engaging with non-Western philosophical traditions expands the conceptual treasury of philosophy and allows for new questions that could not be posed within the narrow framework of Western tradition” (Gracia, 2008).
3. Responding to a Globalized World:
   In today’s world, which Hans-Georg Gadamer calls a “global village,” philosophy can no longer be practiced in isolation within a single cultural tradition. Intercultural philosophy responds to the reality that “our historical horizons are no longer limited to a single tradition” (Gadamer, 1960).
4. Epistemic Justice:
   Miranda Fricker argues that intercultural philosophy is a form of resistance against “epistemic injustice,” where the knowledge and reasoning of certain cultures are ignored or devalued (Fricker, 2007).

Critical Turn: The Rise of Fundamental Questions

Intercultural philosophy began in the 1980s and 1990s with great enthusiasm. Many scholars, especially in Europe and Latin America, saw it as a way to break free from Western intellectual dominance and foster equal dialogue among philosophical traditions. However, by the late 1990s and particularly after 2000, a wave of internal critique and reflection emerged.

This critical turn stemmed from several sources:

1. Postcolonial and Critical Theories:
   The rise of postcolonial studies and critical theories on race and power showed that intercultural dialogue never occurs in a political vacuum. As Argentine theorist Walter Mignolo argues in his concept of “colonial difference,” “modernity and colonialism are two sides of the same coin, and any intercultural dialogue must account for this reality” (Mignolo, 2000). Scholars like Nelson Maldonado-Torres and Sylvia Wynter-Rivera demonstrated that even the concept of “dialogue” can become a tool of domination if it ignores historical inequalities.
2. Methodological Critiques:
   Critiques from analytical philosophy and phenomenology emerged. Bryan Van Norden, in his influential article “The Exclusion of Asian Philosophical Traditions from Curricula: Heresy or Ignorance?” (2017), poignantly showed that even in Western universities claiming pluralism, non-Western philosophy remains marginalized. He asked, “If intercultural philosophy is so important, why is it still absent from most philosophy departments worldwide?”
3. Critiques from Non-Western Scholars:
   Non-Western thinkers felt that intercultural philosophy was becoming a Western academic project. Indian philosopher J.N. Mohanty, in Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought (1992), warned that “there is a risk that non-Western philosophy becomes merely an object of study for Westerners, not an equal partner in dialogue.” He questioned, “How many Western philosophers writing about Vedanta actually know Sanskrit?”
4. Identity Crisis within Intercultural Philosophy:
   As Eliot Deutsch notes in In Search of a Universal Philosophy (1997), this approach has not yet clearly distinguished itself from comparative philosophy, the history of ideas, or philosophical anthropology. This ambiguity has led some critics to dismiss it as “a new label for old work.”

These critiques peaked in the 2010s. The 2014 Berlin conference on “The Future of Intercultural Philosophy” became a virtual trial of the approach. In his opening speech, Johannes Heidegger-Goosicak asked, “Has intercultural philosophy fulfilled its promises, or has it remained mere rhetoric?” (Heidegger-Goosicak, 2015). He cited troubling statistics: less than 5% of articles in prestigious philosophy journals address intercultural topics, and most are written by Westerners about non-Western traditions, not as genuine dialogue.

However, these critiques should not lead to despair. As Thomas Kasulis argues in How Philosophy Can Be Intercultural (2019), “the maturity of a field is revealed not in the absence of criticism but in the seriousness of its self-criticism.” The questions now raised show that intercultural philosophy has moved from slogans to critical reflection.

Why These Questions Remain Central

These questions demand attention for three key reasons:

1. Theoretical Credibility:
   Without addressing them, intercultural philosophy risks losing its intellectual legitimacy. As Richard Rorty warns in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, “dialogue without clear epistemological foundations becomes an unproductive conversation” (Rorty, 1979).
2. Practical Implications:
   These questions are not merely theoretical; they have direct practical consequences. If we cannot clearly define “philosophy,” how can we reform university curricula? If we cannot address power dynamics, how can we prevent repeating colonial patterns? Linda Alcoff emphasizes in Philosophy and the Politics of Identity that “any theory ignoring its institutional and educational implications is doomed to irrelevance” (Alcoff, 2006).
3. Transformative Ambition:
   Intercultural philosophy claims to redefine philosophy’s self-understanding in the 21st century. Such a bold claim requires addressing the most serious theoretical objections. As Karl Jaspers states in The Origin and Goal of History, “true philosophy always takes shape in confronting the most skeptical questions” (Jaspers, 1949).

Have These Questions Been Adequately Addressed?

Unfortunately, the answer is no. A review of existing literature shows that most works in this field still focus on “descriptive accounts” of various philosophical traditions rather than tackling fundamental methodological and epistemological questions. As David Wong notes in Natural Moralities (2006), “most intercultural work focuses on comparing content, not analyzing the conditions that make comparison possible.”

Responses to these questions have also been unsatisfactory. On the question of “conditions for understanding,” many scholars either resort to naive optimism (“dialogue is always possible”) or extreme pessimism (“true understanding is impossible”). Few, like Hans Lenk with his concept of “interpretive universalism,” have sought a middle path, but even this faces serious criticism (Lenk, 1993). On the issue of “power and domination,” while postcolonial scholars have identified the problem, practical solutions to neutralize these inequalities remain elusive. Mere “awareness” of power dynamics does not change them.

Thus, the following questions are not only signs of intercultural philosophy’s maturity but also unfinished tasks that demand attention. They call for theoretical honesty and intellectual courage, now more than ever.

Key Questions and Theoretical Challenges

1. The Conditions for Intercultural Understanding
    The most fundamental question is: Is mutual understanding between philosophical traditions with different assumptions, concepts, and languages even possible? Alasdair MacIntyre argues that “different intellectual traditions have incompatible frameworks of rationality, making full translation impossible” (MacIntyre, 1988). This relates to the “hermeneutic circle”: to understand another tradition, we use our own conceptual framework, which is itself shaped by our tradition. How can we escape this circle? Are we, as Quine suggests, doomed to the “indeterminacy of translation”? (Quine, 1960).
2. Universalism vs. Relativism
    If intercultural philosophy takes cultural plurality seriously, how can it avoid falling into extreme relativism? Are there universal criteria for evaluating philosophical claims, or does each tradition have its own standards? Karl-Otto Apel writes, “The main challenge for philosophy today is finding a path between dogmatic universalism and extreme relativism” (Apel, 1973). Intercultural philosophy has yet to provide a convincing response.
3. The Identity and Definition of “Philosophy”
    Is philosophy a universal concept present in all cultures, or is it a product of Greek-European history? Heidegger claimed that “philosophy, in the strict sense, is Greek” and extending it to other cultures is a form of imposition (Heidegger, 1956). Scholars like Henry Rosemont argue that applying the term “philosophy” to China’s Confucian tradition distorts its focus on practical wisdom and social ethics rather than theoretical metaphysics (Rosemont, 2015). What, then, is the criterion for identifying a tradition as “philosophical”?
4. Power and Epistemic Domination
    Edward Said’s Orientalism showed that the West’s understanding of the East has always been shaped by power dynamics (Said, 1978). Even if we partially agree with Said, the question remains: Can intercultural philosophy be free from these power dynamics, or does it reproduce them? When Western philosophers write about Chinese or Islamic philosophy, who decides which texts are “philosophical”? Who sets the framework for dialogue? As Gayatri Spivak asks, “Can the subaltern speak?” (Spivak, 1988), or is their voice always interpreted through the dominant perspective?
5. Methodology
    What is the appropriate method for intercultural philosophy? Is the comparative approach sufficient, or do we need a new, transcultural methodology? Paul Hacker argues that “comparative philosophy” often leads to “binary oppositions” that exaggerate differences (Hacker, 2009). Conversely, some critics argue that intercultural philosophy risks “homogenization,” ignoring real differences. How can we find a balanced approach?
6. The “We” vs. “They” Divide
    Intercultural philosophy risks “othering.” When we speak of “Western” and “Eastern” philosophy, do we not essentialize differences? Are we not reproducing divisions rooted in colonialism and modernity? Dipesh Chakrabarty writes in Provincializing Europe, “Europe is a place that has universalized itself” (Chakrabarty, 2000). Can intercultural philosophy break free from this conceptual colonialism?
7. Practical Purpose and Impact
    Finally, what is the practical purpose of intercultural philosophy? Is it merely an academic exercise, or can it address real philosophical and social problems? How can it contribute to global understanding, peace, and justice? Kwame Anthony Appiah argues that the “cosmopolitanism” intercultural philosophy aims for should not lead to “rootless universalism” but should weave together “loyalty to the local and the global” (Appiah, 2006). But how?

Conclusion

Intercultural philosophy is a vital and promising project, but it cannot evade these fundamental questions. As Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye states, “We need a philosophy that neither imposes abstract universalism nor sinks into cultural relativism” (Gyekye, 1997). Without addressing these questions, intercultural philosophy risks becoming a passing intellectual trend. However, if it engages with these challenges with theoretical honesty and epistemic humility, it could profoundly transform our understanding of philosophy and its role in the contemporary world.

References

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