Dr. Reza Gholami
Faculty Member, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, President, Iranian Wisdom House, Vienna
Abstract
The post-World War II international order, predicated on hegemonic paradigms such as Pax Americana, is experiencing systemic collapse amid escalating multipolarity and internal contradictions. This article undertakes a philosophical diagnosis of hegemony as an inherently destabilizing force, contending that it perpetuates structural anarchy rather than resolving it. Through a critical synthesis of political philosophy-from Hobbesian state-of-nature realism and Kantian perpetual peace to Gramscian cultural hegemony, Schmittian friend-enemy dialectics, Foucauldian power diffusion, and Habermasian communicative action-the analysis elucidates four core contradictions: (1) domination masquerading as consent; (2) universalist rhetoric concealing parochial interests; (3) absolute power engendering corruption via double standards and imperial overstretch; and (4) unsustainable imperial burdens yielding blowback and narrative erosion.
Rejecting hegemonic succession (e.g., from U.S. to Chinese dominance), the article advocates for a paradigm shift to a Global Republic Order-a republican framework inspired by Arendtian participatory power, Rawlsian veil-of-ignorance justice, and Sen’s comparative justice. This order emphasizes sovereign equality, democratic power-pooling, autonomous institutional oversight, and pluralism bounded by dialogically derived minimum norms. It mandates rewriting foundational texts (e.g., a revised Universal Declaration as a binding Global Republic Charter), vanguard state coalitions, and empowered global civil society mechanisms (e.g., citizen assemblies and transnational referenda).
By foregrounding constructivist insights (Wendt, Onuf) and historical lessons (Kennedy, Arrighi), the paper posits that proactive institutional redesign-via iterative dialogues, pilot initiatives, and civil mobilization-can avert catastrophic transitions, fostering a just, resilient multipolar world. This normative proposal bridges idealist aspirations with realist constraints, offering a blueprint for sustainable global governance.
Keywords: hegemonic decline, Pax Americana, imperial contradictions, multipolar anarchy, Global Republic Order, Kantian republicanism, Gramscian hegemony, Habermasian public sphere, Rawlsian justice, global civil society, bounded pluralism, responsible sovereignty, double standards in international law
Introduction
Today’s world stands on the threshold of a fundamental transformation. What we have witnessed in recent decades is not merely an ordinary political crisis, but the collapse of the paradigm on which the post-World War II international order was constructed. The Trump phenomenon-and everything that flows from it-is not the cause of this crisis, but a tangible symptom of the inner contradictions of the hegemonic order.
This article seeks to trace the roots of this crisis from the perspective of political philosophy. The goal is not simply to describe the existing situation, but to offer a fundamental diagnosis and prescribe an alternative. The central argument is that hegemony-as the architecture of global power-is itself the source of instability, not its remedy. The world therefore requires a new paradigm, which we call the Global Republic Order: an order founded on the equality of sovereignties, the pooling of democratic power, independent institutional regulation, and the acceptance of plurality within a framework of shared minimum standards.
A vital point is that such an order cannot be built by states alone. Global civil society—through grassroots organizations, expert networks, and participatory assemblies—must assume both a constitutive and a regulatory role. This paper attempts, through philosophical inquiry and reference to major thinkers, to help prepare the ground for such a transformation.
- Fundamental Roots of the Crisis: From Westphalia to the Decline of Pax Americana
The modern international system is built upon one basic dilemma: How can order be established among independent, interest-driven units-i.e., nation-states-without domination? The history of the past three centuries demonstrates that this dilemma has never been resolved.
Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan partly solved the problem within societies: “Men in the state of nature are in a condition of war of all against all” (Hobbes, 1651/1996, p. 89). This proposition shows that without a central authority, human society falls into chaos, and Hobbes locates the solution in the social contract and the sovereign’s monopoly on violence. Yet Hobbes offered no equivalent solution at the international level. Relations among states remained in the “state of nature”-a condition in which, in Kant’s words, “no right is guaranteed.”
This theoretical void in Hobbes mirrors the historical experience of seventeenth-century Europe-a continent consumed by the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). The Peace of Westphalia (1648), which ended that war, established the principle of national sovereignty, but at the same time sowed the seed of structural anarchy in the international system. Kenneth Waltz later termed this condition “anarchy”-not meaning total chaos, but the absence of any superior authority capable of compelling states to follow rules (Waltz, 1979, p. 88). In such a structure, states must secure their own survival through a system of “self-help”-which itself generates the security dilemma.
Immanuel Kant, in Perpetual Peace (1795), tried to resolve this dilemma. He proposed a federation of republics-what he called a “pacific federation”-that could eliminate war. But Kant rightly recognized that such a union could not rest on the dominance of one power. He writes: “International right shall be founded upon a federation of free states, not upon a universal monarchy, which would itself be a form of despotism” (Kant, 1795/1970, p. 102). This sentence captures the essence of Kant’s thought: he simultaneously seeks global order and rejects centralized domination-a contradiction that remains unresolved to this day.
The inner contradiction in Kant’s proposal is that he desires a global order without coercion, yet he does not explain how to maintain that order against violators. Michael Doyle’s well-known study demonstrated that liberal democracies indeed do not fight each other (Doyle, 1983)-but this “democratic peace” is confined to the liberal club. What is to be done with non-liberal states? Kant provided no answer. History revealed that liberal democracies, when confronting the “other,” frequently resorted to the very imperial instruments they claimed to have left behind.
Yet history followed a different course. Instead of a free union of states, hegemony prevailed—first Pax Britannica, then Pax Americana. These orders presented themselves as inheritors of the Enlightenment and of Kant, but in practice became precisely what Kant had warned against: the domination of one power that names itself peace.
Antonio Gramsci extended the concept of hegemony from the military to the cultural domain. Hegemony is not merely force; it is “organized consent” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12). This means the dominant power rules not only through coercion but by embedding values and beliefs that make its dominance appear natural and legitimate. Pax Americana exemplified this: a blend of military might and ideological legitimacy (liberal democracy).
Robert Cox, a key figure in critical international relations theory, applied Gramsci’s concept to the global level. He demonstrated that American hegemony is institutionalized not only in relations among states but also in global economic structures. Cox writes: “Hegemony is more than order among states; it is order within global civil society in which a dominant mode of production shapes both economy and culture” (Cox, 1983, p. 171). This domination is exercised through the dollar’s status as world currency, the SWIFT banking system, intellectual property regimes protecting American technology firms, global university rankings favoring American institutions, and so on. This “structural power,” in Susan Strange’s terminology, is more consequential than military power because it defines the framework within which others decide (Strange, 1988, p. 24).
Yet this legitimacy is now disintegrating-not only from external challengers (China, Russia) but from within the hegemon itself. The Trump phenomenon exposed the fact that American society is no longer willing to bear the costs of hegemony. In Paul Kennedy’s phrase from The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, this is “imperial overstretch,” the condition that ultimately destroys every hegemony (Kennedy, 1987, p. 515). Kennedy shows that empires historically collapse when the military and political costs of sustaining dominance exceed their economic capacity—precisely the situation of the United States today.
This breakdown is not only economic; it is also narrative. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that imposing democracy by force is not only ineffective but extraordinarily expensive. The 2008 financial crisis undermined confidence in the neoliberal economic model. China’s emergence as an alternative development path-authoritarian capitalism—proved that the “end of history” had not arrived. Giovanni Arrighi argues in Adam Smith in Beijing that American hegemony, like its predecessors (Dutch, British), has entered the stage of “financialization crisis”-the phase in which capital moves from productive activity to financial speculation, a structural sign of decline (Arrighi, 2007, p. 160).
The overstretch thesis itself is a recurring historical pattern. Rome, Habsburg Spain, Britain—all reached the point where the costs of empire exceeded the benefits. This pattern operates through three main mechanisms:
- The hegemonic security dilemma – to preserve order, the hegemon must maintain a global presence, but this omnipresence generates new adversaries and escalates military expenditure. The United States today maintains over 750 military bases in more than 80 countries (Vine, 2015), and the combined cost of these bases plus the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (exceeding $6 trillion) has placed severe strain on the American economy.
- The benevolent hegemon paradox – to legitimize dominance, the hegemon must portray itself as benevolent and supply global public goods (security, economic stability), but this benevolence is costly. As Bruce Jones demonstrates, the United States no longer possesses either the capacity or the willingness to continue (Jones, 2014, p. 45).
- Internal resource competition – hegemony diverts resources from domestic investment (infrastructure, education, research) toward military purposes, eroding the hegemon’s economic foundations.
Beyond these economic and structural analyses lies a deeper issue: hegemony is inherently incompatible with justice and equality in the international system. Henry Kissinger argues in World Order that every international system has been an attempt to manage the tension between national sovereignty and global order (Kissinger, 2014, p. 3). The hegemonic solution, however, does not resolve this tension; it suppresses it through force. An order founded on domination is neither just nor durable.
Historical experience bears this out. Pax Britannica, despite its civilizational rhetoric, rested on colonialism and exploitation. Pax Americana, despite its democratic rhetoric, supported dictators (from the Shah of Iran to Pinochet in Chile) and engaged in unlawful military interventions (from Vietnam to Iraq). This pattern shows that hegemony-regardless of its particular ideology—leads in practice to domination and inequality.
Furthermore, the hegemonic model is no longer functional. Today’s world confronts challenges that no single power can resolve alone: climate change, global pandemics, mass migration, transnational terrorism, financial crises. These demand genuine cooperation among all nations, not the dominance of one. Immanuel Wallerstein argues in world-systems analysis that hegemony is the exception rather than the rule; most of history has featured multipolar world systems (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 28).
Kant’s dilemma therefore returns-this time enriched by historical experience: hegemony is not the solution; it is part of the problem. What the world needs today is not the replacement of one hegemon by another (from America to China), but the retirement of the hegemonic model itself. The path forward lies in a multipolar, cooperation-based order-one in which major powers, without claiming universal dominance, reach fair and sustainable agreements. This is neither pure Kantian idealism nor hegemonic reality, but something intermediate: Hedley Bull’s “anarchical society” (Bull, 1977)-an order in which states, despite the absence of a superior sovereign, adhere to shared rules. Is such an order attainable? History offers little optimism, but the alternative-the endless cycle of hegemony and decline-is no longer tolerable.
- Hegemony as Anti-Order: A Fundamental Philosophical Diagnosis
Here we must move beyond historical diagnosis. The issue is not merely that this or that hegemon is declining. The real problem is the very concept of hegemony.
Carl Schmitt, the German political philosopher, argues in The Concept of the Political that politics is inherently based on the distinction between friend and enemy: “The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy” (Schmitt, 1932/2007, p. 26). This means politics is essentially antagonistic- “us” versus “them”-and this antagonism can escalate to war. Hegemony globalizes this logic: the world divides into those who align with the hegemon and those who oppose it.
We see this logic throughout the Cold War: the world split into the “free world” versus the “evil empire.” Yet this division was not an objective reality; it was constructed by hegemony. Maoist China was the “enemy” in the 1950s, but by the 1970s (Nixon era) it became a “strategic partner”-not because China had fundamentally changed, but because the hegemon’s interests had shifted. This arbitrariness in defining friend and enemy reveals that the Schmittian distinction is not a fixed truth but an instrument of domination. Chandra Kumar argues that this artificial bipolarity forced Third World countries to choose sides, even when neither side genuinely represented their interests (Kumar, 1993, p. 67). Such division is inherently conflict-generating, and regardless of which power occupies the hegemonic position-America, China, or Russia-the same structural logic recurs.
But we must go beyond Schmitt. The issue is not only friend/enemy distinction. Hegemony is inherently unstable because it rests on irresolvable contradictions:
First contradiction: domination versus consent
Jean-Jacques Rousseau writes in The Social Contract: “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains” (Rousseau, 1762/1997, p. 41). This famous statement expresses that humans are born with natural freedom, but power structures constrain them. Rousseau asks: how can legitimate power be created? His answer: only through the general will. Yet global hegemony is never based on a global general will-even when it calls itself democratic. Its “democracy” exists only within the hegemon, not at the global level. Other countries are not citizens of this order; they are its subjects.
This absence of democratic legitimacy at the global level is the blind spot of all liberal theories of international order. John Rawls, in The Law of Peoples, tried to extend principles of justice internationally, yet even he could not solve this dilemma: how can a just order be built when no global democratic mechanism exists to determine the rules? (Rawls, 1999, p. 37). Hegemony fills this gap with force and ideology, not genuine consent. Thomas Franck shows in his critique that even when the United States claimed to export “democracy,” it was in reality imposing an economic order that favored American multinational corporations (Franck, 1992, p. 91).
Second contradiction: universal claims serving particular interests
Jürgen Habermas distinguishes in his theory of communicative action between strategic action (pursuit of self-interest) and communicative action (pursuit of mutual understanding): “In strategic action one actor seeks to influence another in order to achieve his own ends; in communicative action actors seek mutual agreement” (Habermas, 1984, p. 286). Hegemony always presents itself as communicative-acting for the common good of humanity-yet in reality it is strategic. It expresses the hegemon’s national interests in universal language. This structural deception is eventually exposed and destroys legitimacy.
Edward Said in Orientalism exposed precisely this mechanism: how the West constructed its own “universality.” The West named itself “civilization” and the rest “barbarism,” itself “progress” and others “backwardness,” itself “reason” and others “superstition” (Said, 1978, p. 7). These binary divisions were not descriptions of reality but tools of domination. Modern hegemony does the same: it renames the hegemon’s particular interests as “the interests of the international community,” its security as “global security,” and its economy as the “liberal global economic order.”
Walter Mignolo calls this process the “coloniality of universality” (Mignolo, 2000, p. 89). He demonstrates that what the dominant power calls “universal” is actually local-it merely presents itself as global. This pattern transcends any specific ideology: if China or Russia becomes hegemon, they will follow the same path-presenting their national interests as “the interests of humanity,” their particular values as “universal,” and their dominance as “order.”
Third contradiction: absolute power, absolute corruption
Lord Acton famously stated: “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” (Acton, 1887, p. 335). This historical principle shows that any power beyond supervision and accountability eventually leads to abuse-regardless of original intentions. Hegemony, by its position, stands beyond accountability. No higher power exists to judge it. This structural irresponsibility inevitably produces abuse.
We see double standards in every domain. When Russia invades Ukraine, it is a “violation of national sovereignty”; when the United States invades Iraq, it is a “humanitarian intervention.” When China builds military bases in the South China Sea, it is a “regional threat”; when the United States maintains 750 bases worldwide, it is “preserving global peace.” When Iran pursues a nuclear program, it is an “existential threat”; when Israel (a U.S. ally) possesses 200 nuclear warheads, silence prevails.
Michael Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars attempts to establish moral criteria for war (Walzer, 1977, p. 51). The problem is that in a hegemonic system, the hegemon itself is the arbiter of those criteria. It decides which wars are “just” and which are not. This judgment is never impartial; it consistently favors the hegemon.
The Gaza crisis is a stark example of these double standards. Contrary to the view of a large majority of states and peoples, the Israeli regime-with full American support-has killed over seventy thousand people in Gaza under the name of “legitimate self-defense,” more than 60 percent of them women and children, while clearly violating all standards of human rights and international humanitarian law. It has also subjected the people of Gaza to extreme starvation through a total siege and destroyed their vital infrastructure. Yet the international community-shaped by American hegemony-not only took no serious action to stop this humanitarian catastrophe but continued to supply weapons to Israel. The very hegemony that claims to champion human rights remained silent or offered justifications in the face of massive civilian slaughter. This is not an exception; it is the rule of the hegemonic system: rules do not apply to the hegemon’s friends.
Fourth contradiction: the burden of empire
Paul Kennedy demonstrated that all empires eventually collapse under their own weight: “Empires usually fall when their economic resources can no longer sustain their strategic commitments” (Kennedy, 1987, p. 539). This historical law states that no power can indefinitely bear the military and political costs of global dominance. Armies, bases, interventions, maintenance of world order-all consume resources. Eventually the hegemon’s society grows weary and asks: why must we pay for global order? Trump is the voice of this exhaustion.
But the burden is not only financial; it is also political and moral. A society that sends its soldiers into endless wars eventually tires of those wars-even if it wins. Andrew Bacevich, an American military historian, argues in The Limits of Power that the United States has entered an era of “permanent wars” that offer neither real victory nor conclusion (Bacevich, 2008, p. 12). From Vietnam to Afghanistan, the pattern is consistent: intervention with ambitious goals, entanglement in local conflicts, and eventual withdrawal with no lasting achievement.
Moreover, what Kennedy calls “overstretch” also has a psychological dimension. Chalmers Johnson’s concept of “blowback” shows that imperial interventions produce unforeseen consequences that return to haunt the empire years later (Johnson, 2000, p. 8). American support for the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s contributed to the rise of al-Qaeda and 9/11. The 2003 invasion of Iraq on the pretext of weapons of mass destruction (never found) led to the collapse of the Iraqi state and the emergence of ISIS-a group that was itself a product of the chaos created by that intervention. More recently, intervention in the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria has brought a new dictator to power—one with a prior history as leader of terrorist groups-replacing one dictator with another of terrorist background. This cycle of violence is the product of hegemonic logic that believes the world can be shaped by force, without understanding local complexities and long-term consequences.
Hegemony is therefore not the solution to global order; it is the problem. It is inherently conflict-generating, unstable, and unjust-regardless of which power exercises it.
Michel Foucault argues in his theory of power: “Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (Foucault, 1978, p. 93). This insight reveals that power does not reside solely in the hegemon; it exists in relations, structures, and discourses. Hegemony attempts to centralize this diffuse power-and this very attempt makes it fragile. Real power cannot be fully centralized; there are always resistances, counter-currents, and centrifugal forces.
History has shown that no hegemony is eternal. Rome fell, Spain declined, Britain retreated, and America is now in decay. But the lesson of history should not be “who is the next hegemon?”—but rather “why do we need a hegemon at all?” If China or Russia replaces America, nothing guarantees they will not follow the same path: the same structural contradictions, the same double standards, the same imperial overstretch, and the same eventual decline. The problem lies not in the particular identity of the hegemon, but in the hegemonic structure itself.
- The Global Republic Order: A New Paradigm
If hegemony is the problem, what is the solution? The world needs an entirely different architecture of power—one we can call the Global Republic Order.
“Republic” here carries its classical Roman-Kantian meaning: Res Publica—the “public thing,” something that belongs to all, not to one. As Kant stated, a republic is the rule of law, not the rule of men. And as Montesquieu wrote in The Spirit of the Laws, a republic rests on “civic virtue”: “In republican government, political virtue is the love of laws and of one’s country, and the preference of the public interest over private interest” (Montesquieu, 1748/1989, p. 35). This means a republic requires citizens willing to subordinate private interest to the common good—a principle that must be extended to the global level.
The shift from hegemonic to republican order is not merely a change of terminology; it is a fundamental transformation in how global power is organized. Hannah Arendt distinguishes in On Revolution between “power” and “violence”: genuine power arises from collective action, whereas violence is the instrument of individuals or groups imposing their will (Arendt, 1963, p. 52). Hegemony rests on violence—or the threat of it—while the global republic must rest on participatory power. This is the essential difference: in the hegemonic order, rules are imposed from above; in the republican order, rules emerge through genuine participation.
Nicholas Onuf argues in constructivist international relations theory that international order is a “social construction,” not a fixed natural reality (Onuf, 1989, p. 58). The current structure—based on hegemony—is neither inevitable nor eternal. Humans created it and can remake it. But this remaking requires changes in beliefs, norms, and collective identities—not merely shifts in the distribution of material power.
Alexander Wendt, another constructivist thinker, famously stated: “Anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992, p. 395). This means that even without a world government, states can construct different cultures of interaction: Hobbesian (war of all against all), Lockean (competition within rules), or Kantian (friendship and cooperation). The hegemonic order embodies a Hobbesian-Lockean culture: perpetual competition backed by the threat of violence. But the global republic order can be built on a Kantian culture—one in which states view each other not as enemies but as partners in a common public affair.
Amartya Sen argues in The Idea of Justice that global justice requires “public reasoning”—a process in which not only elites but ordinary citizens participate in defining justice (Sen, 2009, p. 82). He views justice not as a fixed set of perfect rules but as an ongoing process of removing clear injustices. In the hegemonic order, no such public reasoning exists—the hegemon defines what is just. In the global republic order, spaces must exist for genuine, equal dialogue among all countries and cultures.
Jürgen Habermas introduced the concept of the “public sphere”-a space in which citizens freely discuss common affairs and reach agreement (Habermas, 1989, p. 27). He showed that real democracy requires a healthy public sphere, not merely elections. At the global level, the republican order requires a global public sphere-a space in which authentic representatives of nations, not merely power elites, can discuss global challenges. Global media, non-governmental organizations, and transnational citizen networks can form the core of this sphere.
John Dewey, the American pragmatist philosopher, argued that democracy is “a way of life,” not merely an electoral system (Dewey, 1927, p. 143). He maintained that real democracy requires “collective intelligence”-the ability of citizens to solve shared problems through cooperation and trial-and-error. This perspective can be extended globally: the republican order requires a culture of cooperative problem-solving, not a culture of domination and obedience. Global challenges—from climate change to pandemics-demand the collective intelligence of humanity, not dictation by a hegemon.
Perhaps the most important dimension of this transformation is the redefinition of sovereignty. Stephen Krasner has shown that Westphalian sovereignty-the idea of absolute state control over territory-has never been absolute and has always evolved (Krasner, 1999, p. 9). In the contemporary era, we are witnessing the emergence of “responsible sovereignty”-the idea that sovereignty is not only a right but also a responsibility. States are accountable not only to their own citizens but to the global community. This responsibility, however, should not be enforced through hegemonic intervention but through republican global institutions in which all states have an equal voice.
The global republic order is therefore neither utopia nor a ready-made blueprint. It is a horizon for thought and action-a horizon in which justice, participation, and collective responsibility replace domination, imposition, and structural irresponsibility. The path to this horizon is difficult, but its necessity becomes clearer every day.
The global republic order rests on four foundational principles:
- a) Equality of sovereignties
Just as no citizen stands above the law in a democratic republic, no state stands above the law in the global republic order-not even the most powerful.
John Rawls introduced the “veil of ignorance” in A Theory of Justice: “No one knows his place in society, his class position or social status…” This ensures that no one chooses principles out of favoritism toward their own circumstances (Rawls, 1971, p. 12). The same logic must be applied globally: international rules are just if states accept them without knowing whether they will be strong or weak in the future.
This requires eliminating the veto right in global institutions. The current UN Security Council, which grants veto power to five countries, is itself an expression of hegemonic structure. Five countries can impose their will on the remaining 190. This is the direct opposite of equality.
- b) Pooling of democratic power
Here Rawls must be combined with Habermas. Rawls emphasizes distributive justice-the fair allocation of power and resources. Habermas emphasizes participatory democracy-decision-making through public dialogue.
The global republic order needs both:
- Countries must decide together (democracy)
- These decisions must be just (justice)
This pooling can be implemented through weighted voting that combines population, economy, and commitment to republican principles—but no state should hold a veto.
- c) Independent institutional regulation
Montesquieu emphasized separation of powers. The same principle must be extended globally. Global institutions must not be instruments of the hegemon; they must be independent.
Hannah Arendt showed in The Origins of Totalitarianism that power without institutions turns into violence: “Power is actual only where word and deed have not parted company…” (Arendt, 1951/1973, p. 200). Institutions organize and give meaning to power; without them, power becomes raw force and violence. In the global republic order, institutions must be capable of deciding and enforcing decisions even against the most powerful states.
Such institutions would include:
- An International Court of Justice with compulsory jurisdiction
- A World Trade Organization empowered to sanction unfair practices
- A Republican Security Council (replacing the current one) without veto power
- An Assembly of Representatives of Nations (not governments)—similar to the European Parliament
- d) Bounded pluralism
This order must not be homogenizing. Isaiah Berlin emphasized value pluralism in his famous essay: “Human goals are many, and they are not all commensurable, and they are in perpetual rivalry with one another” (Berlin, 1969, p. 169). This means good values are multiple and sometimes incompatible-liberty, equality, security, justice-and no single system can fully realize them all. Diversity of paths is therefore inevitable.
Charles Taylor argues in The Politics of Recognition that different cultures and civilizations have the right to pursue different conceptions of the good life: “Recognition is not just a human need; it is a right that can be expressed in diverse cultural forms” (Taylor, 1994, p. 41). Imposing a single model of life or governance is itself a form of cultural colonialism and a denial of the dignity of other cultures.
The global republic order must therefore accept civilizational diversity:
- China can maintain its own model
- Islamic countries can preserve their identity
- Africa can follow its own path
But this diversity must operate within a framework of shared minimums defined through global dialogue-not unilateral imposition.
Michael Walzer argues in Spheres of Justice: “Justice in different countries may have different meanings, but oppression is recognized everywhere” (Walzer, 1983, p. 314). This is the key starting point: while precise definitions of justice vary across cultures, clear forms of oppression-torture, genocide, slavery-are recognizable in every culture. The task is not to impose one model of justice but to prohibit manifest oppression.
- Rewriting Foundational Documents: From the Current Declaration to a Global Republic Charter
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) is a historically important and foundational document, but it suffers from serious shortcomings, the most significant of which are listed below:
- Historical context – drafted during Western dominance and in the shadow of the Holocaust. It naturally reflects a Western perspective; other global viewpoints are not equally represented.
- Language – some articles are formulated in ways that create tension with non-Western cultures.
- Failure to address contemporary developments – many current global issues are inadequately considered, leaving significant gaps.
- Lack of enforcement mechanism – it is merely a declaration, not a binding treaty.
- Double standards – the very countries that drafted it have repeatedly violated it (colonialism, support for dictators, illegal aggressions).
- Potential for political abuse – it can be (and has been) used to exert pressure on other countries for political motives.
A Global Republic Charter is therefore needed—one that:
- Is drafted through genuine global dialogue—not solely in the West
- Uses language acceptable across cultures
- Is up-to-date and comprehensive
- Possesses strong enforcement mechanisms
- Binds all countries without exception—not written only for the weak
- Closes avenues for political abuse in international relations
Such a charter could have three parts:
Part I: Fundamental Human Rights and Duties
Examples:
- Right to life, freedom from torture, freedom of belief (these are truly universal)
- Formulated in language acceptable to Confucian, Muslim, and liberal traditions
Part II: Principles of Relations among Nations
Examples:
- Prohibition of aggression and use of force
- Right of peoples to self-determination
- Commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes
- Shared responsibility for global crises (climate, pandemics)
- Commitment to fair economic cooperation and prohibition of exploitation
- Respect for cultural and civilizational diversity within shared minimums
Part III: Institutional Structure of the Republican Order
Examples:
- Architecture of global institutions and their formation
- Decision-making mechanisms based on equality and transparency
- Enforcement of law and non-discriminatory punishment of violators
- Role and place of global civil society in the institutional structure
- Vanguard Coalition and the Vital Role of Global Civil Society
- a) Limitations of European leadership
Europe cannot lead alone. Why? Because some of its strongest countries have long histories of double standards:
- Centuries of colonialism
- Support for autocratic regimes for economic gain
- Closed borders to refugees
- Arms sales to dictators
Frantz Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth demonstrated that Europe cannot be a moral teacher: “Europe is literally the creation of the Third World… Europe is a creation of the Third World in the sense that it has been enriched by the labor and resources extracted from the colonized” (Fanon, 1961/2004, p. 312). Fanon’s sharp critique reminds us that many powerful European countries—despite their Enlightenment claims—have significant records of violating human values in recent centuries, undermining their moral legitimacy to lead globally.
- b) A diverse coalition of states
A global coalition is therefore needed, consisting of countries that:
- Have a consistent record of respecting human rights—not merely claims
- Have demonstrated genuine commitment to multilateralism
- Have themselves been victims rather than perpetrators of domination
- Represent geographical and cultural diversity
Possible core members:
- From Europe: Scandinavian countries, Germany, Ireland
- From Asia: Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Iran, Bhutan
- From the Americas: Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile
- From Africa: Botswana, Ghana, Cape Verde
- From Oceania: New Zealand
These countries could form the initial nucleus of the global republic—not to dominate others, but to demonstrate possibility.
Amartya Sen argues in The Idea of Justice: “Justice does not require perfect institutions; it requires the removal of manifest injustices” (Sen, 2009, p. 21). Sen’s pragmatic approach tells us not to wait for a perfect system but to begin by reducing existing injustices. Start with those genuinely committed, then gradually attract others.
- c) The critical role of global civil society assemblies
The fundamental point is that the global republic order cannot be built by states alone. One of the main flaws of the current system is that it exists only among states, not among peoples. To create a truly democratic order, global civil society must play both a founding and a regulatory role.
Jürgen Habermas emphasizes the “public sphere”: “The public sphere can be described as a network for communicating information and points of view in which communication flows are converted into public opinion” (Habermas, 1996, p. 360). Real democracy requires a space where citizens—beyond formal power structures—can converse, express opinions, and influence decisions. At the global level, this public sphere must be formed through transnational civil organizations.
A possible architecture of civil participation in the global republic order:
- Global Civil Assembly
- A parallel body to the Assembly of Representatives of Nations
- Composed of elected representatives from NGOs, labor unions, academic institutions, women’s networks, environmental movements, and other civil formations
- This assembly would have the right to participate in law-making, propose legislation, and exercise critical oversight over official institutions
- Specialized civil networks
- For each domain (climate, human rights, trade, technology), independent expert and activist networks that can produce analysis, reports, and proposals
- These networks could serve as independent truth-finding commissions
- People’s complaint mechanism
- Citizens anywhere in the world should be able to petition global republican institutions directly-not through their governments
- For example, if a citizen believes their government has violated their rights, or if a local community faces environmental harm, they can appeal directly to the relevant court or body-and receive fair, politically unmanipulated consideration
- Global referendums
- In critical cases (fundamental changes to the charter, war, major climate policies), the possibility of worldwide referendums in which the citizens of the world-not only governments-participate
This civil participation architecture would help ensure that the global republic order is not merely of states, but of the people, by the people, for the people-extending Lincoln’s famous principle (Lincoln, 1863) to the global level.
Hannah Arendt emphasizes in On Revolution the importance of active citizen participation: “Power is what keeps the public realm in being… Power springs up between men when they act together…” (Arendt, 1963, p. 175). Real power arises not from bureaucratic structures but from the collective action of people; the global republic order must be built on this principle.
Conclusion: From Idea to Practice
Ultimately, we must recognize a vital point: no new idea should be dismissed merely because it appears impractical at first. History shows that many great transformations initially seemed unrealistic.
Before World War II, the idea of the United Nations—an institution in which all countries of the world would participate and commit to avoiding war—seemed fanciful to many. But the catastrophe of the war demonstrated that the cost of inaction was far higher than the cost of transformation. As a result, the United Nations emerged—imperfect, yet real.
Today we stand at a similar historical juncture. The decline of the hegemonic order, the rise of authoritarianisms, existential crises (climate, dangerous technologies, pandemics)—all indicate that the status quo is unsustainable. The question is not whether transformation will occur, but how: through catastrophe, or through foresight and intelligent design?
What matters is to work step by step around a central idea. At this stage, the global republic order is a conceptual framework that requires nurturing, critique, and rethinking. Yet this very framework can serve as a starting point for:
- Specialized studies, e.g.:
- Legal research on drafting a Global Republic Charter
- Economic studies on mechanisms for pooling power
- Political research on optimal institutional architecture
- Philosophical and intercultural explorations of shared global minimums
- Global dialogues, e.g.:
- International conferences and summits involving academics, civil activists, diplomats, and thinkers from all civilizations
- Creation of dialogue networks among civil institutions in different countries
- Publication of articles, books, and case studies
- Limited experiments, e.g.:
- Beginning with specific domains (climate, technology) where global agreement is easier
- Establishing pilot institutions with voluntary participation by a number of countries
- Learning from successes and failures
- Mobilization of civil society, e.g.:
- Organizing popular movements in various countries demanding a fairer global order
- Creating bottom-up pressure on governments to accept reforms
- Strengthening transnational networks of human rights, environmental, and peace activists
Karl Popper writes in The Open Society and Its Enemies: “We cannot predict history, but we can make it” (Popper, 1945, p. 3). This means we cannot know the future with certainty, but through intelligent and collective action we can shape it.
The global republic order is a generational project. It will not be completed in a decade; it is a historical horizon that can give direction to today’s political action. What is essential is that:
- The idea matures through continuous critique, dialogue, and reflection
- Practical experience is gained through limited experiments and gradual learning
- Political will is formed through civil society mobilization and pressure on political elites
- Global legitimacy is built through the participation of all civilizations and cultures
Immanuel Kant concludes Perpetual Peace by stating: “Though perpetual peace is an impracticable idea, the pursuit of it is a moral duty” (Kant, 1795/1970, p. 130). Kant recognizes that the perfect ideal may never be fully realized, but this is no reason to abandon it; it is reason to strive continually toward it.
The global republic order is such an ideal. It may never be completely achieved. Yet the effort to build it can itself make the world a better place. And that is enough.
A Global Republic Order: a world that belongs to all, not to one.
References
- Acton, J. E. E. D. (1887). Letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton. In Historical Essays and Studies. London: Macmillan.
- Allison, G. (2017). Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Arendt, H. (1951/1973). The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Arendt, H. (1963). On Revolution. New York: Viking Press.
- Arrighi, G. (2007). Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century. Verso.
- Benjamin, W. (1940/2007). Theses on the Philosophy of History. In Illuminations (H. Zohn, Trans., pp. 253-264). New York: Schocken Books.
- Berlin, I. (1969). Two Concepts of Liberty. In Four Essays on Liberty (pp. 118-172). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bull, H. (1977). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. Columbia University Press.
- Cox, R. W. (1983). Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 12(2), 162-175.
- Dewey, J. (1927). The Public and Its Problems. Henry Holt and Company.
- Doyle, M. W. (1983). Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 12(3), 205-235.
- Fanon, F. (1961/2004). The Wretched of the Earth (R. Philcox, Trans.). New York: Grove Press.
- Foucault, M. (1978). The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction. Pantheon Books.
- Franck, T. M. (1992). The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance. American Journal of International Law, 86(1), 46-91.
- Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press.
- Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks (Q. Hoare & G. N. Smith, Eds. & Trans.). New York: International Publishers.
- Habermas, J. (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press.
- Habermas, J. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. MIT Press.
- Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (W. Rehg, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Hobbes, T. (1651/1996). Leviathan (R. Tuck, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2001). After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, C. (2000). Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. Metropolitan Books.
- Jones, B. (2014). Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension between Rivalry and Restraint. Brookings Institution Press.
- Kant, I. (1795/1970). Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. In Kant’s Political Writings (H. Reiss, Ed., H. B. Nisbet, Trans., pp. 93-130). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kennedy, P. (1987). The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House.
- Kissinger, H. (2014). World Order. Penguin Press.
- Krasner, S. D. (1999). Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton University Press.
- Kumar, C. (1993). The Third World in the Age of Globalization: Requiem or New Agenda? Zed Books.
- Lincoln, A. (1863). Gettysburg Address. Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.
- Marx, K. (1852/1978). The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. In R. C. Tucker (Ed.), The Marx-Engels Reader (2nd ed., pp. 594-617). New York: W. W. Norton.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton & Company.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2021). The Inevitable Rivalry: America, China, and the Tragedy of Great-Power Politics. Foreign Affairs, 100(6), 48-58.
- Mignolo, W. D. (2000). Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking. Princeton University Press.
- Montesquieu, C. de S. (1748/1989). The Spirit of the Laws (A. M. Cohler, B. C. Miller, & H. S. Stone, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Alfred A. Knopf.
- Onuf, N. G. (1989). World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. University of South Carolina Press.
- Popper, K. (1945). The Open Society and Its Enemies. London: Routledge.
- Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rawls, J. (1999). The Law of Peoples. Harvard University Press.
- Rousseau, J.-J. (1762/1997). The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings (V. Gourevitch, Ed. & Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Said, E. W. (1978). Orientalism. Pantheon Books.
- Schmitt, C. (1932/2007). The Concept of the Political (G. Schwab, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sen, A. (2009). The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Strange, S. (1988). States and Markets. Pinter Publishers.
- Taylor, C. (1994). The Politics of Recognition. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (pp. 25-73). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Vine, D. (2015). Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World. Metropolitan Books.
- Wallerstein, I. (2004). World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Duke University Press.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill.
- Walzer, M. (1977). Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. Basic Books.
- Walzer, M. (1983). Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic Books.
- Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization, 46(2), 391-425.