Theoretical Problems of Justice/3rd

Series of lectures by Prof. Reza Gholami

 3rd session – July 23, 2024

Third Section:  The Concept of Justice: Subjective vs. Objective, Rights or Morality?

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. In the previous session, we discussed linguistic issues and the universality of the concept of “justice”. The next issue within the linguistic framework that I would like to explore in this meeting is the subjective versus objective nature of the concept of justice. While this topic could also be classified under infrastructure issues, given the prominence of linguistic issues in our discussion, it makes sense to address it here.

Furthermore, it is fitting to consider this issue as a continuation of our earlier discussion on the universality of the concept of justice.

  • Subjective Versus Objective

First, I will explain my view on the subjective and objective nature of a concept. It is generally accepted among thinkers that a subjective concept is one created in the mind, independent of objective reality. Beliefs, opinions, personal experiences, feelings, emotions, and even mental complexes influence the formation of a subjective concept. In philosophy, the subjective concept is the result of reasoning based on logic. The process of creating a concept in philosophy attempts to minimize the influence of illusions and emotions by relying on logic.

Subjective understanding, whether in a philosophical or non-philosophical context, is relative and diverse because one person’s mind, no matter how logical, differs from another’s. In philosophy, “subjective” specifically refers to how an object exists in the mind, as opposed to its existence in reality.

In contrast to “subjective concepts,” we have “objective concepts.” Among most thinkers, concepts that exist outside the mind are interpreted as objective concepts.

When something is objective, it is presented without influence from personal feelings, biases, beliefs, or prejudices. Objectivity involves expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as they are perceived, without distortion by individual emotions or interpretations.

For example, an objective analysis of data would focus solely on the data itself, unaffected by personal opinions or preferences. A claim is labeled objectively true when it is considered true independently of any sentient mind.

If a concept is created solely by the mind and has no equivalent outside of it, it is certainly not beyond the subject. However, if a concept is formed in the mind based on something that exists objectively outside the mind, then that concept can be considered objective in this sense.

In my view, the mind is incapable of conceptualizing in an absolute vacuum, even in the realm of imagination. The mind does not create concepts without receiving and interacting with data from the external world. Even imaginary images are inspired by phenomena outside the mind.

For example, while our minds can create the image of a seven-headed dragon—a purely imaginary concept—this creation is still inspired by objective realities.

You might ask, if subjective concepts are influenced by external reality and objective concepts are also developed within the mind, why do we distinguish between them? One answer is that subjective concepts are inspired by external realities and experiences, but they are constructed by the mind. In contrast, objective concepts originate from outside the mind and are then discovered by the mind, which subsequently develops them into more advanced concepts.

The crucial question is, what does it mean for the concept of justice to be subjective or objective? And what are the implications of these distinctions?

It is then reasonable to ask whether justice is anything other than a constructed concept. That is, is it possible to attribute objectivity to justice outside the mind, independent of the concept as it is recognized? If so, what is the nature of this objectivity?

Justice is undoubtedly a concept rooted in constructivism. In philosophy, constructivism refers to the idea that certain concepts are created by the mind. Justice, therefore, is a fully constructivist concept.

Some may argue that what the mind discovers from outside is also constructive, but in my view, only what the mind actively creates is truly constructive.

Now, should credit concepts be considered subjective or objective? We actively construct our understanding of the world by reflecting on our experiences, which can result from behaviors. A behavior enters our mind and is conceptualized in several stages. Rather than passively receiving information, learners actively create their own understanding. They reflect on their experiences, form mental representations, and integrate new knowledge into existing schemas.

Contrary to common notions, credit concepts arise from social activities, through interaction with others and the accumulation of experiences. Therefore, there is an inevitable relationship between the mental and objective worlds.

In the case of a constructive concept, such as a social rule, it seems that social interactions must be at its core.

There are two views on justice:

  1. Justice originates in the mind and then becomes objectified.
  2. Justice exists outside the mind, and the mind conceptualizes it.

As mentioned earlier, one consequence of viewing justice as subjective or objective is that if justice is subjective, it cannot be considered unique. On the other hand, if justice is objective, it results from social perception. Since people create the concept of justice, it can be somewhat consistent, though not permanent.

In summary, the concept of justice cannot be seen as purely subjective or purely objective. It is a dynamic interplay between subjectivity and objectivity. Although the relative nature of justice cannot be denied, there is a common understanding among people based on the relative nature (Fetrat) of justice.

  • Justice: Rights or Moral?

Another topic I intend to present is “Is justice a matter of rights or morality?” This is the first issue in the group of infrastructure issues and is related to the previous discussion.

Justice encompasses both rights and moral dimensions. Let’s explore the distinction between them:

Law is a system of rules—ideally derived from the core of rights—enforceable through institutions, focusing on order and conformity. It provides a framework for regulating behavior, resolving disputes, and maintaining social stability. Justice, on the other hand, is a moral principle rooted in fairness and equity.

While justice is one of the sources and foundations of law, it goes beyond mere legality, asking whether actions treat all individuals equally and fairly.

In summary, while law provides a formal structure, justice guides our ethical judgments and actions. They intersect but are not synonymous.

It is certain that justice is a fundamental concept in moral philosophy, explored by various thinkers throughout history. Let’s delve into some key perspectives.

The main question is: How fair is an action? Does it treat everyone equally, or does it exhibit favoritism or discrimination?

    1. Aristotle: Aristotle believed that equals should be treated equally, and unequals unequally[2].
    1. Plato: Plato viewed justice as a virtue that establishes rational order, where each part of society should perform its appropriate role without interfering with others’ functioning.
    2. Augustine: Justice involves giving each person their due.
    3. Aquinas: Justice is a rational mean between different forms of injustice, emphasizing proportional distributions and reciprocal transactions.
    4. Hobbes: Justice is an artificial virtue necessary for civil society, based on voluntary social contracts.
    5. Hume: Justice serves public utility by protecting property.
    6. Kant: Justice emphasizes respecting others’ freedom, autonomy, and dignity.
    7. Mill: Justice is a collective name for social utilities that promote human liberty.
    8. John Rawls: Justice involves equal basic rights and duties, with socio-economic inequalities requiring moral justification.

Theories by Rawls and Post-Rawlsian philosophers are particularly significant. Post-Rawlsian thinkers continue to develop alternative conceptions of justice.

These theories address not only the nature of justice but also its application to controversial social issues such as civil disobedience, punishment, equal opportunity, slavery, and property rights. Justice remains a cornerstone for ordering interpersonal relations and maintaining stable societies.

As can be seen, some philosophers view the source of justice not as ethics or morality in the conventional sense but rather as one of the fundamental rights. For instance, while Aquinas defines justice as establishing a rational balance between injustices—an unusual perspective—Hobbes reduces justice to a social law based on expediency. However, the views of Hume and Mill inadvertently bring justice into the moral sphere. However, in John Rawls’ theory, the core of justice is fairness.

Fairness generally refers to the quality of being just, equitable, and impartial. It involves treating people equally without favoritism or bias. Here are a few key aspects of fairness:

    • Impartiality: Ensuring that decisions are made without favoritism or bias.
    • Equity: Providing equal opportunities and resources to everyone, considering their specific needs and circumstances.
    • Justice: Upholding what is right and reasonable, often aligned with societal and legal standards.

In Iranian Islamic thought, the concept of fairness has deep roots. Fairness is considered one of the most important moral virtues. It is defined as “justice and the implementation of due measures, acknowledging people’s rights and fulfilling them,” along with the principle that “every good we want for ourselves, we want for others as well,” and “we don’t wish harm or loss for others,” and “what we dislike for ourselves, we don’t want for others either.”

The origin and source of law are not solely rooted in morality. Rights can have several origins, including the rulings of practical reason issued by philosophers; individual and social ethics; religion and its divine laws; traditional laws; and the results of collective reason or social contracts. It is accurate to say that these are the sources of rights, and laws are based on rights.

Morality and social contracts also play significant roles in shaping our understanding of rights, but their origins are multifaceted and interconnected. Morality is said to arise from cultural, religious, and philosophical contexts, while social contracts involve agreements among individuals within a society to establish norms and rules for collective well-being.

In the context of social contracts, it is assumed that a group of wise individuals in society, by setting aside any biases, determine the basic rights essential for social life. Some believe that what the collective mind arrives at, by removing any biases, is necessarily moral. However, in my opinion, such a claim cannot be made with certainty.

  • Social Contracts

A few points about the social contract should not be overlooked:

    1. The social contract is an imaginary and hypothetical concept with no historical record.
    2. There is serious doubt that a group of wise individuals can completely clear their minds of any bias.
    3. To agree on basic human rights, the wise must have criteria that common sense can accept in any era. But what are these criteria?
    4. It is uncertain whether wise individuals throughout history would necessarily reach a single conclusion about fundamental human rights. The views of wise people in this era may differ from those in previous ages.
    5. Where is the role of cultural diversity in the consensus of the wise? Are diverse and rich cultures ignored in the social contract?

Now, let me briefly discuss the laws of practical reason. Practical reason or practical wisdom provides rules for social life, but philosophers do not have a common approach to these rules. Each philosopher approaches them based on their intellectual capacity and biases, leading to different conclusions. Therefore, if the laws of practical reason do not receive the approval of the wise, it is unclear whether they can help in organizing and advancing society, especially in resolving social disputes. With this in mind, these laws must be agreed upon by a group of wise individuals and become part of a social contract.

One may ask whether the rules of practical reason are necessarily moral. Since the origin of both ethics and reason (theoretical and practical) is human nature (Fetrat), there fundamentally cannot be a conflict between the laws of ethics and the laws of practical reason.

In addition to ethics, social contracts, and the laws of practical reason, there are also religious laws. Religion claims that rights and truth are absolute, and that religious laws are completely in accordance with these rights and truths.

Can religious laws help organize and advance society and resolve disputes? In my opinion, if religious laws do not conflict with reason, the answer is positive. It can even be argued that religion, due to its sacredness, is more effective in resolving disputes. However, religious laws (assuming they are wise) are mainly effective for religious societies and may not be suitable for non-religious or diverse, pluralistic societies.

Why is there so much emphasis on reason? My answer is that reason is the only human faculty capable of understanding the truth. Even in Islam, Muslims are asked to weigh religious teachings against reason. Of course, there are issues related to the functional system of reason that can be discussed in more detail elsewhere.

Are religious laws necessarily moral as well? Fundamentally, the answer is yes, because the primary claim of religions throughout history has been the expansion and deepening of individual and social ethics.

However, the religious claim about the expansion and deepening of ethics does not preclude evaluating the fidelity of religious laws to ethics, because the potential for religious distortion is always present.

So far, it has been clarified that morality plays a foundational role in all sources of law. Perhaps it is better to consider morality equivalent to rights, meaning that morality is the primary source of fundamental rights. If, in some context, morality does not play this foundational role, the alignment of rights with morality is certain. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the source and origin of justice is morality, and among moral virtues, fairness is closest to the source and origin of justice.

Thank you for your attention.

[1] این عبارت در جملات ابتدایی این بخش استفاده شده اما ناقص است و ربطش به  جملات قبل و بعد معلوم نیست:
« Correct, Accurate: In accordance with facts or truth. Suitable, Appropriate: Pertaining to the right person or thing for a specific situation.»

[2] Reference?

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